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Given temptation, it is surprising that corruption is
not more prevalent.In an environment where wealth
is the most important measure of success, can public
officials be blamed for wanting to enrich themselves
by exploiting their powers? By definition,corruption
is:“… acts in which public power is used for person-
al gains in a manner that contravenes the rules of the
game” (Jain 2001, 73). If corruption has been con-
trolled,it is due to the ability of civil society and pub-
lic institutions to check the behavior of public offi-
cials. When unchecked, corruption is accompanied
by misallocation of resources, economic stagnation,
social and economic disparities and, eventually, po-
litical violence. The first decade of this century pro-
vides ample casual evidence of these effects. Haiti,
with a legacy of corrupt leaders, remains one of the
poorest countries in the world; Nigeria, despite its oil
reserves, has a stagnant economy; 40 percent of the
population in India lives below poverty line while the
richest family in the country builds a two-billion-dol-
lar family residence; Tunisia, in spite of respectable
growth rates for a number of years, found its corrupt
leader unceremoniously overthrown in early 2011.
To understand corruption, we must first recognize
what form corruption takes, what allows it to thrive,
what consequences it can have on the society and
what measures have been successful in controlling
corruption.
What is corruption?
Like the heads of Hydra’s dragon, corruption pre-
sents itself in many shapes though all originate from
the same body politic.Forms of corruption differ from
one another in terms of both the source of power that
is exploited and the impact they have on the econo-
my and the society. Let us look at two forms of cor-
ruption,each occupying extreme positions on a scale
of corrupt activities. At one end is a somewhat be-
nign example, such as a doorman asking for a small
tip to let you into the office.At the other end,we find
a more malignant example of a leader treating soci-
ety’s assets as personal property.
Most people are exposed to corruption in its benign
form when they have to pay a bribe to receive a ser-
vice from a government official.Quite often,the ser-
vice would have been a right of the citizen; the bu-
reaucrat may merely have discretion over imposing
some costs (in the form of delays and opportunity
costs of permit denial) on the citizen before granting
the service.A bribe is demanded to reduce that cost.
This form of bureaucratic corruption usually occurs
once a regulatory regime has been determined and
the resource allocation decisions have been made –
the bureaucrat is, in fact, interfering with the imple-
mentation of decisions.
Economic models of bureaucratic corruption must
tackle issues of information asymmetry (which agents
are corrupt and which will participate in propagating
corruption) and uncertainties about costs (associated
with probabilities and penalties of detection,as well as
with the purchase of loyalties of other agents) in addi-
tion to all the usual unknowns such as demand and
supply. Rose-Ackerman (1978), Shleifer and Vishny
(1993), Dabla-Norris (2002), Ahlin and Bose (2007),
Lambert-Mogiliansky et al. (2007), among many oth-
ers, provide examples of such models. Acemoglu and
Verdier (2000) illustrate the role of corruption in gov-
ernments’ attempts to correct market failures.
At the other extreme,“political” or “grand” corrup-
tion arises from a rogue dictator’s control over a
country’s resource allocation and expenditure deci-
sions. This leader will maximize his personal wealth
rather than the welfare of the population. Of neces-
sity, he will have to have acquired an almost com-
plete control of political powers within the country.
A portion of the wealth amassed through corruption
is used to purchase the loyalty of those who will help
the dictator remain in power and to undermine the
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opposition.This form of corruption leads to a misal-
location of resources and an extreme degree of con-
centration of wealth into the hands of a few. Exam-
ples of this form of corruption abound.Zaire’s econ-
omy stagnated, and the country was left in economic
and political turmoil upon the departure of its cor-
rupt leader – Mobutu. In Iraq, Saddam Hussein re-
sorted to corruption in order to prevent the devel-
opment of civic groups that could oppose his regime.
The chaos that followed his departure was due, in
part,to a complete vacuum of political institutions in
the country.
Some dictators may appear to have a “benevolent”
side to them, corruption is accompanied by sharing
some of the wealth with the population. Saddam
Hussein ensured that Iraqi citizens received educa-
tion and health care while amassing an estimated 
USD 10 to 40 billion in personal wealth. During the
nearly thirty years of Suharto’s dictatorship, Indo-
nesia’s GDP increased by almost ten times while he
stole an estimated USD 15 to 35 billion from the na-
tion. Using his country’s oil wealth, Kazakh presi-
dent Nazarbayev has created three billionaires with-
in his family while raising the per capita GDP of cit-
izens from USD 700 in 1994 to USD 9,000 at present.
It is possible to argue that “benevolence” is really
involuntary – that it is merely a reflection of the high
cost of purchasing the loyalty of the public and of
those who help maintain the corrupt structure. Di
Tella and Franceschelli (2009) provide evidence of
one such expenditure in Argentina – promises of
government advertising revenues to the media in
exchange for non-reporting of corruption.A slightly
less virulent form of this type of corruption arises
when powerful oligarchs ensure that political deci-
sions are in accordance with their economic inter-
ests. This may be an accurate description of corrup-
tion in contemporary India and Russia (Lamont and
Fontanella-Khan 2011). Johnson and Kwak (2010)
cite examples from the United States during the
eighteenth century.
Political or grand corruption is difficult to model.
Most studies have focused on individual cases (such
as Klitgaard 1990) and on the context of the persis-
tence of corruption. Exceptions include Charap and
Harm (2002) and Jain (1993).We will tackle the issue
of persistence of corruption in the following section.
There are many ways to view corruption other than
in between the two extremes discussed above. Aidt
(2003) provides four ways to differentiate the range
of corrupt activities. It is worthwhile to note that we
exclude “fraud” and the mere existence of poverty
(or worsening of income distribution) as signs of cor-
ruption. Similarly, influencing public policy through
legitimate routes, whether by providing information
or by making political contributions, is not necessar-
ily evidence of corruption.“Political Action Commit-
tees”in the United States and similar lobbying groups
in other countries have a legitimate role to play in mo-
dern democracies. In the same vein, policy decisions
that may be directed at specific voting groups, and
hence in the personal interest of a politician, are not
considered corrupt.
Why does corruption survive? 
The conditions for corruption to arise are ubiqui-
tous. Its survival, however, depends upon three con-
ditions.
The first condition necessary for the emergence of
corruption is that there be rents associated with a
government’s regulatory powers. Let us consider the
rents associated with the sale of rights to serve the
wireless market (A recent corruption scandal in In-
dia puts the value of such rents at USD 38 billion in
that country). Barring pathologically honest bureau-
crats, an entrepreneur will collude with public offi-
cials to capture those rents.Potential losers from this
exchange,which include competitors and consumers,
will have incentives to prevent such sales. A neces-
sary corollary to this condition is that those who lose
from such a collusion (between entrepreneurs and
corrupt bureaucrats) are not able to organize and do
not have access to effective political and legal means
to prevent the private sale of public property. Anti-
cipation that well-developed public institutions will
coordinate the responses of the losers may prevent
corruption from developing in the first place.Foellmi
and Oechslin’s (2007) model illustrates how corrup-
tion exists in imperfect capital markets but not in
competitive ones.
The second condition requires that corrupt bureau-
cracies be somewhat independent within the remain-
ing (if honest) administrative structure of the gov-
ernment. External controls on the bureaucracy –
whether imposed by the remainder of the adminis-
trative system or by the society at large – must be
weak. If some agents seem to get away with acts of
corruption, the internal dynamics of a corrupt
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bureaucracy will motivate other bureaucrats to ex-
pend more effort on increasing the level of their illic-
it income;some of that effort will have to be spent on
ensuring an appropriate redistribution of the illicit
income within the bureaucracy. Wade (1985) de-
scribes an extreme example of such institutionaliza-
tion of corruption. Corruption within the irrigation
department in one state in India grew to such an ex-
tent that the entire effort of administrators was de-
voted to managing the flow of illicit income rather
than on meeting the needs of their clients.
The third condition requires that the public institu-
tions controlling corruption be weak and ineffective.
These institutions include civic groups that exert mo-
ral pressures, political parties and the media that
could expose the wrongdoing, and the legal system
that would have the authority to prosecute and pun-
ish the guilty.
Societies going through rapid modernization and
economic expansion resulting from innovation (in-
dustrial or information technology revolutions, for
example) are prime targets for corruption.Initial de-
cades of industrial revolutions in most presently-in-
dustrialized countries as well as periods of rapid
growth in East Asia,China and India have been char-
acterized by high levels of corruption. In all these so-
cieties,the possibilities of economic expansion creat-
ed the fuel for corruption to grow. Britain had more
corruption in eighteenth century and America in the
nineteenth century than in adjoining centuries. Ef-
fective political institutionalization lagged behind
economic modernization (Huntington 1968, 59). In
both these instances, however, the political modern-
ization that followed was accompanied by a signifi-
cant decrease in corruption.The development of po-
litical institutions increased competition to such an
extent that corrupt agents could no longer continue
to exercise monopolistic control over the economic
growth. Corruption-reducing political modernization,
however, is not a foregone conclusion. Bliss and Di
Tella (1997) illustrate situations where agents “endo-
genize” the level of competition and corruption can
persist in spite of increased competition.
Measures of economic and social development seem
to correlate very strongly with a reduction in corrup-
tion (Svensson 2005, 28–29).Treisman (2000) finds a
correlation between corruption and a host of other
social characteristics, including type of legal system,
colonial legacy and religion.While it is clear that the
level of corruption in societies with well developed
political institutions is lower,it is difficult to establish
the direction of causation. Does development (eco-
nomic,political or social) cause corruption to decline
or is development possible only when corruption
declines? One reason we may not have an answer is
that researchers have not been able to distinguish
between the different types of corruption – two ex-
tremes of which were described as bureaucratic and
political corruption in the previous section.Most meas-
ures of corruption used in empirical studies appear
to define corruption as a monolithic entity definable
by a cardinal number or a rank. Most commonly
used corruption measurements include the Corrup-
tion Perception Index by Transparency Internatio-
nal, Business International, International Country
Risk Guide and the Governance index by the World
Bank, which includes a measure of corruption (Jain
2001,76–77;Treisman 2000,Table A.2).These indices
are inadequate if the issue of causation between cor-
ruption and social and political indicators is to be
addressed.
An important set of agents whose role is not well
understood is the intermediaries – those agents who
facilitate the conduct of corrupt activities between
the clients and the bureaucrats. Bose (2010) argues
that these intermediaries may ensure the persistence
of corruption while Khanna and Johnston (2007)
highlight the role of intermediaries in India in reduc-
ing the risks associated with corrupt transactions.
Consequences of corruption
Persistent myths refer to corruption as the second
best solution in view of inefficient government regu-
lation or to its role as “the grease in the wheels of
commerce”.Aidt (2003, F633–35) presents and then
demolishes the argument for “efficient corruption”.
Kaufmann (1998) lays to rest the “grease”argument.
While corruption may make one transaction easier,
it gives rise to a demand for more corruption – al-
most like adding sand to the machine, which will
then require more grease.
We can say with some certainty that corruption is not
good for economic growth. It is quite possible that
the two types of corruption identified above have
very different effects. Countries marked with bureau-
cratic corruption could grow as long as the resource
allocation process is not influenced by what moti-
vates political or grand corruption – the interests of
the decision maker, not the efficiency of the alloca-tion process.The East Asian Tigers have witnessed a
rapid economic growth over the past four decades in
spite of corruption. Casual evidence suggests that,
for the most part, corruption in that region leads to
redistribution of earnings, not to misallocation of in-
vestments.
Benign forms of corruption affect the economy much
as a tax would. Based on a study of Ugandan firms,
Fisman and Svensson (2007) show that corruption
reduces firms’ growth just as taxation can.Corruption
changes prices and, hence, the equilibrium due to
shifts in the supply and demand of public services.
Political corruption affects growth by influencing de-
cisions on resource allocations,by changing prices and
by influencing the availability of resources. In addi-
tion, corruption hurts the poor more than the other
segments of a society. Since the continuation of cor-
ruption requires suppression of those who may op-
pose corruption, it also inhibits the development of
social and political institutions.
Corruption is known to deter investment because it
can (negatively) bias an entrepreneur’s assessment
of the risks and returns associated with an invest-
ment (Svensson 2005). Allocation of investment it-
self will be biased in the presence of political cor-
ruption. Corruption may provide incentives to lower
public expenditures (Pani 2009) and may encourage
investment in large (inefficient) projects with con-
centrated cash flows (and thus more subject to ex-
propriation) than more efficient maintenance expen-
ditures. Corrupt politicians, for example, encourage
the building of new schools rather than funding ex-
penditures that would provide books and supplies
for the classrooms. Corrupt officials will direct state
and private investment to areas which maximize
their returns, not those of the society (Krueger 1993;
Alesina and Angeletos 2005).
Serious empirical research on the link between cor-
ruption and growth began with Mauro (1995; 1997).
Allowing for some differences between the initial
conditions of countries, Mauro found a negative rela-
tionship between corruption and growth rates, and
surmised that worsening composition of public ex-
penditure induced by corruption may play a role.
Gyimah-Brempong (2002) and Pellegrini and Gerlagh
(2004) validate this relationship after accounting for
differences in the initial conditions of countries and
their trade openness, political stability or education.
Corruption inhibits growth of small and medium en-
terprises (Tanzi and Davoodi 2001) – firms that usu-
ally make a large contribution to growth in modern
economies. Wei (2000) found that foreign investors
are deterred by corruption in spite of incentives of-
fered by host countries. Interestingly, he finds that
the US’s own laws against bribery seem not to have
affected the behaviour of US investors.This, as Cragg
and Woof (2001) point out, may be because anti-
bribery laws are rarely enforced. Gupta, Mello and
Sharan (2001) show that corruption biases public ex-
penditures in favour of the military because, as Hines
(1995) has pointed out, high-technology goods of an
oligopolistic industry are highly susceptible to cor-
ruption.
Corruption introduces distortions in factors markets.
It can lower tax revenues (and, hence, funds avail-
able for public investments) either because corrup-
tion induces inefficiencies in the tax-collection sys-
tem (Imam 2007) or because corrupt democracies
will have incentives to lower tax rates (Pani 2009).
Corruption will direct talent away from productive
activities towards rent-seeking activities (Murphy,
Shleifer and Vishny 1991; 1993). Examining enrol-
ments in engineering and law, Tanzi and Davoodi
(2001,100) find that “…corruption allocates talent in
a growth reducing fashion…”. Ahlin (2001) demon-
strates the effect of bribery on the allocation of tal-
ent away from entrepreneurship.
While corruption affects the whole economy, it seems
to target the poor. First, consistent with current de-
bate which points to benefits for the poor from eco-
nomic growth, corruption hurts the poor by lower-
ing an economy’s growth rate. Second, corruption
introduces costs and benefits that create a bias
against the poor (Ahlin and Bose 2007).Third, cor-
ruption can be causally linked to the worsening of
income distribution.
Corruption reduces poor peoples’ access to public
goods – a segment of society that perhaps needs
those goods more than any other.The poor, because
of their limited initial wealth, are not able to pay the
bribes required to obtain these services (Foellmi and
Oechslin 2007; Kulshreshtha 2007).The Global Cor-
ruption Report for 2006 by Transparency Inter-
national is replete with examples of corruption in
health services in countries around the world and its
effects on the poor.Mauro (1997) found that govern-
ment expenditures on education and health were ne-
gatively and significantly related to corruption. Gupta,
Davoodi and Tiongson (2001) examined a wide vari-
ety of social indicators in a sample of 117 countries.
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They presented survey as well as statistical evidence
that corruption leads to inefficient delivery of gov-
ernment social services.
There is strong empirical support for a relationship
between corruption and income distribution. Elimi-
nating the influence of other factors using instru-
ment variables, Gupta, Davoodi and Alonse-Terme
(2002) found a significant impact of corruption on
the Gini coefficient for income in a sample of 40 coun-
tries over 1980–97. “A worsening in the corruption
index of a country by one standard deviation (2.52
points on a scale of 0 to 10) increases the Gini coef-
ficient by 11 points, which is significant, given the
average Gini value of 39” (p. 40).
Examining the data for a sample of African coun-
tries, Gyimah-Brempong (2002, 205) concluded that
“…corruption is positively correlated with income
inequality in African countries, all things equal. …
(One unit decrease in corruption index) is associated
with between 4 and 7 units increase in Gini coeffi-
cient of income inequality”. Extending the research
beyond Africa, Gyimah-Brempong and Munoz de
Camacho (2006) demonstrated that different regions
of the world are affected differently by corruption.
These authors concluded that differences in the
impact of corruption are caused by variations in the
types of corruption that exist in different regions and
countries. This conclusion is based on some implicit
assumptions about the types of corruption.Their as-
sumption is that, on the one hand, most African coun-
tries suffer from the same type of corruption. On the
other hand, the authors conclude that diverse regions
of the world, some of which had higher growth rates
than Africa despite the presence of corruption, had a
different type of corruption.You and Khagram (2005)
find some evidence of causation in both directions –
corruption affects poverty and poverty has some effect
on corruption. Using the number of convictions as a
measure of corruption,Dincer and Gunalp (2005) find
that corruption and inequality are related in the US.
Fighting corruption 
Perhaps the most important, and the most difficult,
question about corruption is “how can we reduce
corruption?”Attempts to fight corruption face a fun-
damental contradiction: reducing corruption re-
quires the commitment and cooperation of those
who benefit from corruption, which is not in their
self-interest. In order for a campaign against corrup-
tion to succeed, it will require a strong moral com-
mitment from the segment of leadership that aspires
to reduce corruption in addition to sufficient support
from the public.There are but a few examples of suc-
cessful fights against corruption. More often than
not, a reduction in corruption accompanies econom-
ic growth in open societies,where the cost of corrup-
tion begins to exceed the ability of those who bene-
fit from it to purchase compliance from other politi-
cians and bureaucrats.
Hong Kong was able to fight corruption in the 1970s
after an Independent Commission Against Corrup-
tion was established in 1974. Georgia claims to have
reduced its corruption level significantly in recent
years.Petty bureaucratic corruption in some states in
India has been reduced while political corruption
threatens to destabilize the country (Lamont et al.
2011).
Successful campaigns to fight corruption occur along
three dimensions. Laws must be strong enough to
create a deterrence. It is, however, not enough to
have laws on the books – there must be a will to
implement them.Although US anti-bribery laws are
among the oldest in the industrialized world, they
are rarely enforced (Cragg and Woof 2001). China
has resorted to capital punishment for certain types
of corruption but has not been able to eliminate it.
Corruption cannot be tackled without a strong civic
society. The population must have powers to chal-
lenge politicians and bureaucrats. Governments
must agree to introduce transparency in their opera-
tions and allow information to flow freely.The “Right
to Information Act” in India that allows citizens to
demand information from bureaucrats has given
much hope to activists in India. While it has been
used to fight petty corruption, it has done little to
reduce instances of “grand”corruption.Finally,barri-
ers to participation in the economic life of a society
must be removed.Corruption has its losers – the pop-
ulation at large and those who are denied participa-
tion in economic activity.When those who are hurt by
corruption are allowed to voice their discontent, the
chances of a decline in corruption increase.
Concluding remarks
Neither corruption nor its study is new. Interest in
this subject, however, has become central to the dis-
cussion of economic performance over the past two
decades. This has followed the realization that cor-ruption may be the biggest barrier to removing
poverty in the developing world.
There is very little doubt that corruption hurts soci-
eties. For the leaders of societies who engage in cor-
ruption, however, the temptation to succumb to cor-
ruption far exceeds any moral constraints or com-
passion for those who may suffer as a result. Con-
straints on their behavior may have to come from
outside – a global leadership that places value on the
reduction of poverty and suffering, and the resulting
peace dividend.Arriving at that type of enlightened
approach is likely to take some time; in the mean-
time, the best we can do is inform ourselves.
The remainder of this volume of DICE REPORT
consists of papers that elaborate on themes intro-
duced in this essay:what forms does corruption take,
what causes it, what are its consequences and how
can we fight it.
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